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Eight Perspectives on
Yvon Neptune v. Haiti
By JENS IVERSON*
I. Introduction
A. Purpose
The purpose of this article is to examine a recent decision by the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights ("Court"), Yvon Neptune v.
Haiti' ("Decision") from a number of complementary viewpoints. In
doing so, I hope the article can be of use to a variety of groups, and
help those groups to understand and work with each other more
successfully.
Yvon Neptune v. Haiti is noteworthy in a number of respects. It
is the only available final decision from the Court regarding human
rights violations in Haiti.2 The Petitioner, Yvon Neptune, was the
Prime Minister of Haiti from 2002-2004. 3 He was also one of scores
* B.A. Yale University, J.D. University of California, Hastings College of the
Law, 2007, Cum Laude, Order of the Coif. He is currently practicing at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Thanks to Blaine
Bookey, Brian Concannon Jr., and Katharine Orlovsky for feedback; to Prof. Naomi
Roht-Arriaza for her generosity and for inspiration; to Profs. Karen Musalo and
Richard Boswell for introducing me to Haiti; to all those I have traveled to Haiti
with and all of those who have received me, especially Father Jomanas Eustache
and Mario Joseph, avocat; to all of the original virtual human rights clinicians,
Adriana Dydell, Brandon Hollinder, Christina Iturralde, again Katharine Orlovsky,
Ok-Hee Shim, and Sarah Sullivan; and to my beloved family, who taught me
everything first. Special and even further thanks to Katharine Orlovsky, who
makes everything possible, and much more fun.
1. Case of Yvon Neptune v. Haiti, Merits, I/A Court H.R. Reparations and
Costs, Series C No. 180 (Judgment of May 6, 2008), available at
http://www.corteidh. or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_180_ing.doc [hereinafter
Decision].
2. See all jurisprudence from the Court regarding Haiti, available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/pais.cfm?idPais=22&CFID=559122&CFTOKEN=
95363513.
3. Decision, supra note 1, 5, 9.
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of victims of detention without due process, along with other of
political opponents of the Interim Government of Haiti ("IGH").4
His detention was nominally based upon human rights abuses he
had allegedly committed.5 Thus in this case, human rights rhetoric
was not only a shield against state power, but also a sword used by
the state.
Yvon Neptune's 25-month detention was found to be in
violation of eleven provisions of the American Convention on
Human Rights ("American Convention") by the Court.6 The Court
determined that Haiti's substandard judicial processes and
conditions of detention amounted to human rights violations, and
ordered Haiti to provide not only individual reparation and
satisfaction but also system-wide reform of its judiciary and
detention system.7 Whether Haiti will ultimately comply with the
decision remains to be seen, although in the meantime it is clear
they have done nothing.8 The degree to which pervasive, systematic
human rights violations continue will rely on a variety of actors. All
of these actors are part of the story of this case. At least some of
these actors will be considered in this Commentary.
B. Roadmap
Parts II and III will introduce the Inter-American Human Rights
System and the Haitian context for the Decision, respectively. Part
IV briefly outlines the procedural history and outcome of the case.
Parts V through XII will examine the case from a variety of
perspectives. Parts V, VI, VII, and VIII will look at the significance
4. See inter alia Liste Partielle des Militants du Parti Politique Fanmi Lavalas
Illegalement Arretes Sous le gouvernment Alexandre/Latortue et Encore Detenus
Arbitrairement, http://www.ijdh.org/pdf/headlinel-10-07.pdf (last visited Feb.
16, 2009); Amnesty International Urgent Action AMR 36/008/2005, July 25, 2005,
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR36/008/2005/en (last
visited Feb. 16 2009); Amnesty International Report AMR 36/003/2006, Jan. 10,
2006, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR36/003/2006/en
last visited Feb. 16, 2009; Amnesty International Report AMR 36/010/2006, (Sept.
1, 2006), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR36/010/2006/en (last visited Feb.
16 2009); and Amnesty International Urgent Action AMR 36/002/2006, Jan. 6,
2006, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR36/ 002/2006/en
(last visited Feb. 16 2009).
5. Decision, supra note 1, 8.
6. Decision, supra note 1, 192.
7. Id.
8. Communication from Brian Concannon, Mar. 9,2009.
[Vol. 32:2
Eight Perspectives on Yvon Neptune v. Haiti
of the Decision to Neptune, to others incarcerated in Haiti, to
Haitian activists and attorneys, and to Haitian government officials,
respectively. Part IX looks at the virtual clinic model from the
perspective of U.S. law students, and Part X examines the virtual
clinic model for human rights organizations. Part XI addresses the
significance of the Decision for foreign governments and
international agencies, while Part XII discusses the importance of
the Decision for the Inter-American Human Rights System more
generally. The Comment concludes in Part XIII with a review and
an analysis of options to move forward.
II. A Very Brief Introduction to the
Inter-American Human Rights System
The Court was only able to come to its determination in Yvon
Neptune v. Haiti after the sustained efforts of Haitian and U.S.
attorneys, activists, law professors and law students, and of course
Neptune himself. Survivors of human rights abuse cannot simply
file a complaint with the Court - for survivors, the road to the Court
begins elsewhere, and requires a minimal understanding of the
Inter-American Human Rights System.
There are two bodies in the Inter-American Human Rights
System charged with promoting and protecting Human Rights. The
1969 American Convention established the Court and gave
additional responsibilities and capacities to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights ("Commission"), 9 which was
established a decade earlier. 10 The Commission receives petitions
alleging human rights violations, and may submit cases to the
Court. If the Commission submits a case to the Court, the
Commission appears before the Court to litigate the case.1
The best guide for petitioners before the Commission can be
found in the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights ("Rules"), particularly Title 11.12 Petitions before
9. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights
art. 33, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 99 (1969); see
generally American Convention on Human Rights Part II.
10. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, http://www.cidh.oas.org/
what.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2009).
11. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 9, art. 57.
12. Available at http:/ /www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic18.Rules%20of%20
Procedure%20of%20the%20Commission.htm, (last visited Feb. 7, 2009) [hereinafter
2009]
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the Commission must allege that a member state of the
Organization of American States ("OAS") is responsible for a
human rights violation. The human rights violation alleged must
violate the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, the Convention (when the Member State involved has ratified
the Convention)13 or "other applicable instruments[.] " 14  The
petition must demonstrate that domestic remedies have been
exhausted or that further pursuit of domestic remedies would be
futile.'5 The petition must be filed within six months of the
exhaustion of remedies or, if futility is alleged, within a reasonable
amount of time since the alleged violation has occurred. 16 All other
technicalities described in the Rules must also be complied with,
including the use of one of the four official languages 17 and the
relevant information regarding the petitioner and the alleged
violation.18
Assuming the petition is successful and the violation is not
resolved, the Commission may submit the resulting case to the
Court.19 If, after following the Rules of Procedure of the Court,20 the
Court finds that a right or freedom guaranteed by the Convention
has been violated, the Court will issue a ruling that ensures the
enjoyment of the right or freedom and, if appropriate, ensures
remedy and compensation to the injured party.21 The judgment of
the Court is final and not subject to appeal.22 States Parties to the
Convention must comply with any judgment of the Court in a case
Rules]; see also GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS PRAcTICE (Hurst Hannum
ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 3d ed., 1999).
13. See Rules arts. 49-50.
14. Id. at art. 27.
15. Id. at art. 31.
16. Id. at art. 32.
17. Id. at art. 22.
18. Id. at art. 28.
19. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 9, art. 61.
20. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Annual
Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 1991, O.A.S. Doc.
OEA/Ser.L/V/III.25 doc.7 at 18 (1992), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to
Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 145
(1992) available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas7ctr.htm (last
visited Feb. 7, 2009).
21. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 9, art. 63.
22. Id. at art. 67.
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in which they are a party.23
III. A Very Brief Introduction to Haitian Politics and
Geopolitics
Aside from attorneys, activists, law professors and law
students, two other actors are important to understand the political
backdrop of the case: Haitian government officials and foreign
governments. Haitian politics is not a simple matter; nor is it a
pleasant one. Many approaches to analyzing a legal decision would
purposefully eschew any political analysis. Many authors, familiar
with the vehemently held opinions by many with regards to Haitian
political issues, would avoid any comment so as to avoid charges of
bias or failing to treat a matter in adequate depth. To understand
the IACHR findings regarding former-Prime Minister Neptune as
well as the allegations against him, however, a brief tour of the
political terrain may be helpful.
Haiti is the poorest country in the western hemisphere. Haitian
poverty is deeply rooted in the history of Haitian politics and
foreign relations. The successful rebellion against French
colonialism and slavery was not rewarded by recognition by the
United States (the only other independent state in the Western
Hemisphere) or by European colonial powers. France only ceased
to threaten Haiti's independence and offer recognition after
payment for the loss of property caused by the liberation of French
slaves. That payment caused crippling debt, which continued into
the mid-twentieth century. Domestically, the promise of liberty
quickly turned to domestic tyranny, as Haiti was ruled largely by a
succession of unelected military rulers, broken primarily by U.S.
occupation from 1915 to 1934.
In 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected and, after being
ousted by a military junta from 1991 to 1993, his populist
government disbanded the military and pursued a wide-ranging
anti-poverty program. The first democratic transition between
elected Presidents in Haiti's history occurred in 1996. Haiti looked
like it might become a more stable country. On 20 March 1998, Haiti
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. This period was not without
controversy. For example, the 2000 election was claimed by some to
23. Id. at art. 68.
20091
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be flawed. 24 In addition, the government during this period faced
allegations of not responding adequately to crimes committed by
government supporters. 25
Neptune began his term as Prime Minister of Haiti on 15 March
2002 as a member of the ruling Lavalas Party. On 29 February 2004,
rebel forces made their way to the capital, and within days the
government was overthrown. On 12 March 2004 the new President
Boniface Alexandre proclaimed Gerard Latortue the new Prime
Minister.26 The IGH arrested hundreds of Lavalas politicians.
Neptune cooperated with the transition, but was forced into hiding
due to threats against his life. On 27 June 2004, hearing that an
arrest warrant had been issued against him, out of respect for the
law and as a model for others, Neptune turned himself in to the
police.
IV. Case History
This section will describe in more detail the case history of the
Decision and the outcome of the case. It will not go into complete
detail as to the procedural history of actions within the domestic
Haitian legal system, instead focusing on the Inter-American
Human Rights System, which is the primary focus of this
Commentary.
Before beginning with the procedural history, it is worth
24. See Standards Urged for Community of Democracies: Letter to Convening
Countries of the Community of Democracies, (Aug. 8, 2001), available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2001/08/08/standards-urged-community-
democracies (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). But see Option Zero In Haiti, New Left
Review 27, 37-9 (2004), available at http://www.ijdh.org/pdf/NLRart.pdf last
viewed (Mar. 1, 2009). For a view which noted both the success of the election for
the general Haitian population and flaws see The Organization of American States,
The Election Observation Mission For The Legislative, Municipal And Local
Elections In Haiti February To July, 2000 (Dec. 13 2000), available at
http://www.oas.org/sap/
docs/permanent council/2000/cp doc_3383_00_.eng.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
25. See, e.g., Haiti: Political Violence Condemned, Human Rights Watch, (Dec.
17, 2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2001/12/17/haiti-political-
violence-condemned, (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). The former elite displaced by the
elected government were, predictably, a large source of allegations against the
government, see Option Zero In Haiti, New Left Review 27, 37-9 (2004), available at
http://www.ijdh.org/pdf/NLRart.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
26. Latortue, in turn, installed a new judicial elite. On December 9, 2006, he
fired five members of Haiti's highest court, the Cour de Cassation, and replaced them
without following the procedures mandated by the Haitian Constitution.
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looking at a few of the underlying facts of the case, as stated in the
Petition and unquestioned throughout the process before the
Commission and the Court.
A. Basic Facts
A rebellion broke out in early February 2004. By 7 February
2004, an anti-government group named RAMICOS took control of
the police station in St. Marc, near the capital city, Port-au-Prince. 27
On 9 February 2004, Prime Minister Neptune briefly visited St. Marc
to encourage the police to establish order and defend the city from
forces heading towards St. Marc and Port-au-Prince. 28 Two days
after the visit, police and civilians entered La Scierie, a RAMICOS
stronghold, which touched off violence throughout the city. The
ensuing conflict left at least three dead, and many cars and houses
burnt.29 Neptune maintains he had no knowledge of the operation
before it happened, and never received a report from the police or
any government body.30
Shortly after the fall of the government on 29 February 2004, a 2
March 2004 press release was issued by a group called NCHR-Haiti
claiming that 50 people were killed in La Scierie on 11 February
2004, and called for Neptune's arrest.31 Journalists and human
rights workers who visited the area after the alleged events
contradicted NCHR-Haiti's allegations, specifically finding only a
few bodies.32 But NCHR-Haiti, with financial support from the
government of Canada, aggressively pushed for a criminal
prosecution of Lavalas supporters it accused of being involved in
the La Scierie incident. NCHR-Haiti's parent organization, NCHR-
New York, eventually criticized NCHR-Haiti for its role in the case,
and forced it to change its name. The Executive Director of NCHR-
New York stated "The sum total of the lack of action by Haitian
government authorities on this case because of inertia,
27. Decision, supra note 1, 8, citing Application submitted by the Commission,
77 25-28 (folios 107 and 108).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights regarading
Yvon Neptune, Apr. 20, 2005 11 available at http://ijdh.org/pdf/YvonNeptune
IACHRPetitionENU.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Petition].
31. Petition, TT 12, 15.
32. Id. 7 12.
2009]
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incompetence, omission or ill will amounts to a travesty of justice." 33
Police detained Neptune in the Haitian National Penitentiary
("Penitencier National") on 27 June 2004.34 Article 26 of the Haitian
Constitution commands that a detainee be released unless a judge
permits further detention.
B. Procedural History
On 20 April 2005, a Petition was filed on Neptune's behalf, over
nine months after his incarceration. It alleged violations of multiple
provisions of Articles 5 (humane treatment), 7 (personal liberty),
and 8 (fair trial) of the American Convention.
On 4 May 2005, the Commission transmitted the Petition to the
Haitian State, requesting a response in an abbreviated time due to
the risk to Neptune's health posed by Neptune's hunger strike.35 On
6 May 2005, the Commission called upon the Haitian State to "take
the urgent measures necessary to guarantee the right to life, physical
integrity and access to effective judicial protection and guarantees of
Mr. Neptune."36
On 12 October 2005, the Commission issued a Report, which
concluded that it was competent to consider the Petition, that the
Petition met the requirements set out in Articles 46 and 47 of the
American Convention (including exhaustion of domestic remedies,
timely filing, and stating of an appropriate claim), and declared the
Petition admissible.37 The petitioners were aided by the State's
failure to respond to the Petition, which the Commission treated as a
waiver of the claim of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. 38 Even
if there was not such a waiver, the petitioners had a strong
33. Press Release, National Coalition for Haitian Rights, NCHR-Haiti Does Not
Speak for the National Coalition for Haitian Rights (NCHR) (Mar. 11, 2005).
NCHR-Haiti changed its name to the National Network for the Defense of Human
Rights.
34. Decision, supra note 1, 9.
35. Report No 64/05, Petition 445/2005, Admissibility Yvonne Neptune Haiti,
5 available at http://hastingshumanrights.org/documents/NeptunePetitionFor
Admissibility.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Report].
36. Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm'n on Human Rights, IACHR Expresses
Concern Over the Situation of Yvon Neptune (May 6, 2005), available at
http://www.cidh.org/Comunicados/English/2005/19.05.htm.
37. Report, 4.
38. Id. 32.
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argument that further actions would have been futile.39 The
Commission also declared that the facts alleged indicated possible
violations of Articles 1 (obligation to respect rights) and 25 (the right
to judicial protection) of the American Convention.40
On 27 July 2006, Neptune was given a provisional release for
reasons of health.41 This provisional release could be revoked at any
time. He has remained in a state of legal limbo ever since.
On 2 November 2006, at the invitation of the Commission, the
petitioners wrote in support of the referral of the case to the Court.
On 14 December 2006, the Commission referred the case to the
Court, asking the Court to declare violations of several provisions of
Articles 1, 5, 7, 8, and 25 of the American Convention and order
Remedies.42
On 13 April 2007, the Appeals Court of Gonaives ruled
("Appeals Court order") that the case against Neptune must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.43 Ordinarily, such orders are
served within a few days. The order has never been served, leaving
Neptune at constant risk of rearrest at the order of any politically
motivated magistrate.
On 6 May 2008, the Court issued its Decision in the case of Yvon
Neptune v. Haiti. It found the State of Haiti violated 11 provisions of
the American Convention. Remedies provided by the Decision
included the findings of the decision itself and the award of $95,000
in damages and costs. 44 Included among the orders intended to
guarantee non-repetition were the orders to end Neptune's
continuing judicial insecurity45 and, significantly, to follow
constitutionally mandated protections against political prosecutions
of government officials 46 and to adopt a plan to reform the prison
system so as to respect basic human rights guarantees within two
years.47
As of this publication, Haiti has done nothing to comply with
39. See American Convention, Art. 46(2)(a).
40. Report, 39.
41. Decision, supra note 1, 57.
42. Id. 1-2.
43. Id. 58.
44. Id. 159-69, 186.
45. Id. 192.
46. Id.
47. Id.
2009]
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the Decision, and the charges against Neptune remain in a state of
limbo, not formally dropped but not apparently pursued.48 In a 4
September 2008 letter from the Haitian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
to the Court, Haiti did not indicate any intention to obey the
Decision and worried about the encouragement it might provide to
other detainees to petition the Court - stating that stating that the
State of Haiti believes that the decision set an unfortunate precedent,
one likely to destabilize the country.49
V. The Significance for Neptune
The Decision has at least four areas of significance for Neptune:
life, liberty, property, and reputation. First, Neptune survived his
illegal detention. Second, the decision should give Neptune an
increased reason to hope that he will be free from further detention
without due process of the law, although this hope is limited by a
reasonable fear of further detention by Haiti's refusal to effectuate
the order of the Gonaives Appeals Court. Third, the State of Haiti
has been ordered to provide financial compensation to Neptune.
Fourth, the fact that no evidence was brought to support the
allegations against him should help clear his name for those who
remained in doubt.
Neptune did not die in prison, and he is no longer illegally
detained. The first prospect seemed likely at points. Particularly
during the periods when Neptune went on hunger strike,5 0 when
the prison officials killed prisoners in his prison,51 or when gunmen
stormed the prison and kidnapped him,52 it was unsure whether
Neptune would survive to see the slow processes of the Inter-
American Human Rights System finish. His detention, deemed
illegal by the Court, 53 has ended. Given the number of individuals
who remain in detention without any judicial review of the charges
against them, his release is very likely due in part to the case and
affiliated efforts, including public pressure put on the IGH to release
48. Interview with Brian Concannon, (Feb. 16, 2009).
49. "L'Etat haftien croit cet arrt est un malheureux prcedent, propre A
d~stabiliser davantage le pays le plus pauvre de l'h~miphre amricain." Letter on
file with the author.
50. Decision, supra note 1, 135.
51. Id. 137.
52. Id.
53. Id. 192.
[Vol. 32:2
Eight Perspectives on Yvon Neptune v. Haiti
him.
As a practical matter, Neptune cannot be sure that the State of
Haiti will not detain him on the same charges, particularly if the
elected government is overthrown again, but also if any politically
motivated magistrate wishes to move forward based on the
formalistic excuse that it has not received legal notice that the
charges have been quashed. Even if the Decision is given the
binding effect that it is supposed to have by the State of Haiti, it is
important to note that the Court is not a criminal court, and did not
make a finding as to the underlying factual allegations against
Neptune. Neptune, however, has a strong argument that the
deficiencies of the previous effort to prosecute him should not be
without legal effect, and that no further efforts should be made to
prosecute Neptune on this matter. Such a prosecution may not
amount to a violation of ne bis in idem (the principle in civil law that
largely mirrors the common law prohibition against double
jeopardy), but any investigation would have to put together an
extremely strong dossier to justify renewing criminal proceedings
after two years of illegal detention from the last effort by the State of
Haiti. Any action against Neptune would immediately come under
close scrutiny by human rights groups and the Inter-American
Human Rights System. The Decision limits the appropriate venue,
which lessens the possibility of a politically motivated prosecution.
The Decision also clearly states that prosecutions of "crimes" which
do not exist in the penal code are impermissible. Finally, the
compensation the State of Haiti is already obliged to pay Neptune
and the negative publicity surrounding this prosecution presumably
provides some disincentive to prosecute Neptune with anything less
than an ironclad prosecution case. This is countered, however, by
the reality that the Haitian Government continues to ignore the
Decision and refuses to serve the Appeals Court order and remove
Neptune's ongoing legal uncertainty.
In addition to preserving his life and liberty, the Decision has a
very specific importance to Neptune: It orders monetary
compensation. The amounts ordered are not large by the standards
of most U.S. attorneys, and are less than what was asked for, largely
due to the lack of documentation presented to the Court.54
Nonetheless, due to the Decision, the State of Haiti is obliged to pay
54. For example, no documentation was provided regarding lost income
(Decision, 162), costs ( 161) legal costs ( 186).
20091
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Neptune $10,00055 for the expenses borne by his family during his
incarceration, 6  $50,000 for lost compensation, 57  $30,000 in
damages, 8 and $5,000 is ordered for fees and costs,59 for a total of
$95,000. This amount is not an unusual award from the Court.
Finally, the Decision goes some way to clearing Neptune's
name. This is greatly hampered, however, by his continued judicial
insecurity. While again, the Court is not a criminal court and did
not make a factual determination regarding the allegations formerly
laid against Neptune, the Decision nonetheless reveals the lack of
substantiation presented to support the charges against Neptune.
As argued in the submission from the Commission and noted by the
Court, even after years of detention, "[t]he mental and physical
elements necessary to establish Mr. Neptune's criminal
responsibility based upon a complicity theory remain entirely
unclear." 60 This issue may be of particular importance to Neptune,
given his life as a politician and a public person.
Neptune has been reluctant to participate in public life due to
his ongoing juridical insecurity.61 He lives in constant fear of
rearrest on politically motivated charges if he again enters the public
arena. In the end, the significance of the Decision to Neptune is yet
to be determined. If the Government of Haiti drops all charges and
Neptune's rights and security are restored, the Decision will have
brought provided Neptune with significant redress. Until that
point, the promise of justice will remain fundamentally unrealized.
VI. The Significance for Others Incarcerated in Haiti
The Decision made factual findings and orders that have
implications for those incarcerated in Haiti, well beyond Neptune
who is now released. The most direct importance of the Decision for
incarcerated persons is the Decision's order to substantially improve
the conditions of Haitian prisons. More indirectly, Neptune's
successful challenge of being detained without any ongoing judicial
55. All figures are in United States Dollars.
56. Decision, supra note 1, 161.
57. Id. 163.
58. Id. 168.
59. Id. 186.
60. Id. 46, citing Application submitted by the Commission, Dec. 14, 2006,
113 (merits file, Vol. I, folio 129).
61. Id. 178.
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process may provide a model for others in a similar situation, or at
least some reason to be hopeful. Finally, there may be some
potential for creating a political push for more humane and effective
criminal justice system within Haiti.
To begin to examine the situation for those incarcerated in Haiti
in general, it is useful to look at the specific findings regarding
Neptune's conditions of confinement. The Court found it worth
specifically noting that between 27 June 2004 and 10 March 2005,
Neptune was imprisoned in a dark cement cell measuring 4.5 meters
by 2.5 meters.62 The cell had no windows, and poor ventilation to
reduce the stench from the walls contaminated by human waste.63
Rats and insects infested the cell, particularly at night.64 Neptune
survived on the water and food his family brought him every day.65
Due to the complete lack of security and widespread violence within
the prison, he feared for his life every time he left his cell. 66 The
Court found that the conditions of detention constituted inhuman
treatment and violated Article 5.2 of the American Convention.67
For many, prison conditions are much worse than those faced
by Neptune. In most prisons in Haiti today, one will find extreme
overcrowding, spreading disease, lack of bedding, poor ventilation,
and food and water shortages.68 The State of Haiti provides neither
adequate medical care, nor the security needed to prevent outbreaks
of violence.69 The small percentage of the prison population who
have been convicted of a crime are not separated from those who
have not been convicted.70
Fewer than 10 percent of those detained have been convicted of
a crime.71 Many are imprisoned for purely political reasons. 72 The
62. Id. 132.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. 133.
66. Id.
67. Id. 138.
68. Id. 137.
69. Id.
70. Id. 148.
71. Health & Human Rights Prison Project, p. 5, available at
http://ijdh.org/pdf/ HHRPP.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
72. See generally http://www.ijdh.org/articles/article-political-prisoners.htm
(last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
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median pre-trial detainee stays imprisoned for 20 months. 73 Courts
have called the prison conditions inhuman, even likening them to
conditions in a slave ship.74 There is a nationwide bribery racket
that requires payment for freedom. 75
The effect of the Decision should be to improve prison
conditions. It specifically orders the State of Haiti to establish,
within two years, a program of action to substantially improve the
conditions of Haitian prisons.76 The basis of this order is the duty of
Haiti to develop and implement a prison policy that prevents critical
situations that endanger the basic rights of detainees, particularly
guaranteeing the life and personal safety of inmates and also to
ensure those deprived of their liberty have the conditions necessary
to live with dignity. 77 While the Decision cannot physically force the
State of Haiti to improve prison conditions, as a matter of law, it
makes it clear that failure to improve prison conditions is a violation
not only of the rights of detainees, but a violation of the State of
Haiti's treaty obligation to respect the decisions of the Court.
Just as Haitian prison conditions are inhumane, the state of the
Haitian criminal justice system is deficient.78 As demonstrated by
the percentage of detainees who have not been convicted of any
crime, the right to a speedy trial is routinely violated. 79 Simply put,
unless the physical, technical, and human infrastructure of the
criminal justice system is radically improved, there will be no
domestic check on wrongful detention. Preventing corruption and
establishing the rule of law is essentially impossible in such
conditions. Indeed, only the irregular provision of food and water
keeps many detainees alive, and many detainees are only released
through the extrajudicial discretion of those running detention
units.
Many Haitians do not extend great support for expenditures
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Decision, supra note 1, 183.
77. Id. 182.
78. Regarding the systematic problems with the Haitian criminal courts, see
Brian Concannon Jr., Beyond complementarity: The International Criminal Court and
national prosecutions, a view from Haiti, COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV., v. 32 no. 1 (Fall
2000), pp. 209-16.
79. See Dr. Jomanas Eustache, The Importance of Teaching Law and the
Reinforcement of the Judiciry System in Haiti, HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. R. (2009).
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upon the prison system or the judiciary. Given the inhumane
conditions which many Haitians endure, it is perhaps
understandable that humane prison conditions are not always first
priority. Government officials, donors, attorneys, law students, and
activists need to be aware of this lack of support if they are to help
the incarcerated.
Incarcerated people are in one of the weakest positions in
society. This weakness can only be overcome if the goals of ending
corruption and establishing the rule of law are valued and some
measure of empathy and solidarity with those detained is achieved.
Neptune's example of someone illegally detained and eventually
freed through the rule of law may be useful for those advocating for
the rights of detainees.
VII. The Significance for Haitian Activists and
Attorneys Advocating on Behalf of Detainees
Haitian activists and attorneys advocating on behalf of
detainees can, if it seems most like the most appropriate use of
limited resources, use the Decision both as a model for further legal
actions and as a political tool.
The Decision found that the State of Haiti violated eleven
provisions of the American Convention. Three of those provisions
are worth particular notice:
Article 5.2 states in full: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. All
persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for
the inherent dignity of the human person."
Article 5.4 states in full: "Accused persons shall, save in
exceptional circumstances, be segregated from convicted persons,
and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to their
status as unconvicted persons."
Article 7.5 states in pertinent part: "Any person detained shall be
brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by
law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within
a reasonable time or to be released without prejudice to the
continuation of the proceedings."
These three provisions are violated for the vast majority of
Haitian detainees. Given proper documentation of the violation of
these provisions through affidavits, as well as an overall description
of the situation of the detainee, Haitian activists and attorneys
2009]
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should be able to file petitions before the Commission using the
Petition on behalf of Neptune as a template. Specific reference to
the Decision may be helpful, as the Court has already found those
specific conditions and facts to constitute a violation. As occurred
with Neptune, the Commission may identify additional violations of
the American Convention based on the overall description
provided. In addition, having the Commission contact the State of
Haiti regarding a particular detainee, which is standard practice
after the Commission receives a well-formed petition, may be
enough to encourage the Haitian criminal justice system to move a
detainee from obscurity into a more timely evaluation of whether
release is appropriate. Such a remedy is hardly a certainty,
however.
The Decision also could be useful strictly on the domestic level.
If Haiti fails to improve its prisons, particularly if it fails to even
come up with a plan to improve its prisons as required by the
Decision within two years, activists for detainee rights can use the
Decision as a tool to gain media attention and political support. The
two-year anniversary of the Decision, 6 May 2010, should be kept in
mind as a media hook and a campaign focus.
VIII. The Significance for Haitian Government Officials
Haitian activists may appear to be in conflict with government
officials, who may frequently demand change and hold them to
account. In fact, those who organize outside of the institutions of
government for the human rights of detainees ultimately need
Haitian government officials and civil servants who want to protect
human rights in Haiti to be able to do so. Haitian government
officials may need the visible pressure on the outside to justify
otherwise politically unpopular expenditures on prisons and the
criminal justice system. Similarly, the Decision arguably gives
political cover for reform, allowing some blame for the expense of
improving the prisons and courts to be shifted to the Court and to
foreign pressures generally. In turn, groups such as the Bureau des
Avocats Internationaux ("BAI") can be started or funded by the
Government if the group feels that does not compromise their
independence.8 0 The BAI was started with government funding,
80. For more on the BAI, see Brian Concannon Jr., The Bureau des Avocats
Internationaux, a Victim-Centered Approach, in EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING
HUMAN RIGHTS, (David Barnhizer ed., 2001); Ken Bresler, If You Are Not Corrupt,
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and led the investigation and prosecution of the Raboteau Trial, one
of the most notable important human rights cases in the Americas
over the last two decades.
Neptune's case holds particular interest for Haitian government
officials. Neptune, after all, is himself a former government official.
His arrest may reasonably be seen as a political prosecution of a
political actor, one that resulted from a loss in political power.
Haitian government officials are more likely to be themselves
subject to political prosecutions should they fall out of power. On
the other hand, Haitian government officials of good will may
reasonably wish an independent judiciary to have the capacity to
check corruption of other Haitian government officials. The
relationship between government officials and the criminal justice
system has the inherent tension between preventing the judiciary
from being a tool of corrupt power and allowing the judiciary to
keep the government free from corruption.
In theory, one useful tool to manage this tension is highlighted
by the Decision: the High Court of Justice. The High Court of
Justice is a special court formed by the legislature, similar to
impeachment in the United States. The Haitian Constitution
requires regular courts to wait until the High Court of Justice
convicts an individual before trying a high public official, a
procedure that was not followed in Neptune's case.
In reality, the High Court of Justice has never been formed,
existing only in an untested provision of the Haitian Constitution.
There are no established rules of procedure, no jurisprudence, and
no institutional principles or experience that would guide such an
experience. Currently, the Senate has so many empty seats it can
hardly create a quorum. If this tool is used, it will be need to be
monitored closely.
Finally, given the possibility of political prosecutions, all
government officials who might be on the receiving end of a
prosecution should at a minimum take some interest in improving
prison conditions. The tension described above provides no reason
not to improve prison conditions. If not because it is a good cause
or for the votes of the friends and families of detainees, some
Arrest the Criminals: Prosecuting Human Rights Violators in Haiti, Case Study at
Harvard's Kennedy School of Government (Spring 2003) available at
http://law.marquette.edu/s3/site/images/haitiCaseStudy.pdf (last visited Mar. 1,
2009).
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government officials should improve prison conditions out of
simple, long-term, self-interested prudence. Those interested in
institutionalizing protections for human rights should consider
steps such as ratifying relevant human rights treaties and joining
institutions such as the Caribbean Court of Justice.
IX. The Significance as a Model for U.S. Law Students -
The "Virtual Clinic" Model.
For U.S. law students, the interest in working on international
human rights far outstrips the opportunities provided. It is
certainly worthwhile to focus on human rights problems within the
United States, but opportunities to work on human rights problems
abroad, often referred to as international human rights problems,
are also worthwhile. Human rights clinics do exist, but they are
often small, and mostly in elite institutions. Direct observation of
international human rights problems is expensive, often involving
travel. In addition it often requires overcoming language barriers,
cultural barriers, and ignorance about the context of the human
rights problem.
At the University of California, Hastings College of the Law
("Hastings"), there was a depth of professorial knowledge of
international human rights problems, and a relationship with
Haitian attorneys and U.S. attorneys who focus on Haiti through the
Hastings to Haiti Partnership. Hastings also has a strong range of
clinical programs, but at that point lacked a clinical program
focused on international human rights violations.
The effort, which eventually resulted in the filing of the Petition
on behalf of Neptune, was originally called the Virtual Human
Rights Clinic ("VHRC"). The VHRC was "virtual" because unlike a
normal clinic, the students, lead attorneys, and client never met in
person, relying on conference calls and email to coordinate the
creation of the Petition and supporting Declarations. It had no
physical address, no office space, and no exclusive facilities aside
from a website created and funded by the students. It was student-
led, with only minimal supervision by Hastings professors. The
VHRC had no template for the Petition it wished to author. Most
difficult was the challenge of institutional durability faced by many
student led organizations - that as students graduated or moved on
to other projects, the effort would collapse. This challenge was
addressed due to the ability of the VHRC to partner with
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institutions that had already proven their durability, namely the
Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti ("IJDH") and the BAI.
The IJDH and the BAI were critical in providing direction for the
effort. Together, these groups have helped victims prosecute
human rights cases, defended detainees, and raised public
consciousness on Haitian human rights issues for over a decade.
The students who began the VHRC knew that if they could help to
start the ball rolling, begin the chain of legal proceedings that
eventually led to the Decision, that the IJDH and the BAI could
continue the process. In many ways, the virtual clinic model may be
closer to a "collective externship" than a traditional clinical
education, with students receiving, at the most, independent study
credit and the low-level of supervision typically associated with
independent study.
The VHRC also launched a concerted media effort, realizing
that international attention could help protect Neptune while in
prison, and increase his chances for eventual release. A website was
launched, and news bulletins were released and published the day
of filing the Petition before the Commission.81 Local and national
radio and national television interviews were arranged.8 2 On 6 May
2005, after an initial radio blitz, and less than three weeks after the
filing of the Petition, Amnesty International called upon its
members to write the Prime Minister, Justice Minister and Public
Prosecutor to express concern regarding Neptune's illegal detention
and threatened health while in prison.83
The "virtual clinic" model overcomes many of the barriers that
may keep many law students from gaining experience in
international human rights work. By partnering the time, energy,
and willingness to learn of the students with the technical expertise
of the professors and the institutional permanence and practical
knowledge of the institutions, the virtual clinic model made it
possible for the different actors to achieve together what they could
not achieve separately. In part because of the success of the VHRC,
Hastings has expanded its clinical program to include an
81. See Generally Hastings Human Rights Project for Haiti,
http://hastingshumanrights.org (information regarding press outreach and
supplementary information about the Decision and the VHRC).
82. Id.
83. Document - Haiti: Health Concern/Legal Concern, Yvon Neptune, AMNESTY
INT'L, (May 6, 2005), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR36/
004/2005/en/ domAMR360042005en.html.
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institutional human rights clinic, which is complimented by the
student-led Hastings International Human Rights Organization
("HIHRO") (the current name for the organization, which began as
the VHRC, then became the Hastings Human Rights Project for
Haiti ("HHRPH")), as well as the HHP.
The virtual clinic model demonstrates that with the right
amount of student energy and self-direction, cooperation with
human rights institutions, professorial knowledge, barriers of cost
and infrastructure can be overcome. U.S. law students can gain
practical experience in the field of international human rights.
Substantive human rights projects can be launched and successfully
concluded. Solidarity across international borders can be increased.
The argument in favor of the virtual clinic model should in no
way be read as an effort to diminish the value of a formal clinical
program which works directly with clients and provides intensive
professorial oversight; nor should it diminish the value of an
individual externship with a human rights institutions. It is simply
an alternative that interested U.S. law students and human rights
organizations may wish to investigate. Organizations such as the
IJDH that already partner with law schools are particularly well
suited to take advantage of such an arrangement.
X. The Significance for Human Rights Organizations
Human rights organizations, even collectively, do not have the
money, time, or physical infrastructure to adequately address
human rights issues around the world. Internships or externships
can help address the need, but they are not without costs in money,
time and physical structure, even if they are more cost-efficient in
some respects than hiring staff.
The virtual clinic model has potential advantages for human
rights organizations. Instead of recruiting, housing, training and
monitoring one intern, it allows human rights organizations to
harness the efforts of a group of self-motivated and self-organized
law students, often through a single point of contact. If properly
managed, the human rights organization will only be associated
with efforts that further its mission.
The virtual clinic model also can have an advantage by creating
an institutional memory that can be transmitted efficiently from
student to student, rather than having to educate each intern from
scratch each time. This is particularly important when the subject
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matter has a long, steep learning curve, such as Haitian human
rights efforts. Some law students may work for three years at a
virtual human rights clinic, which is rare for an internship.
The virtual clinic model also has potential dangers for human
rights organizations. Without a group of students that are self-
motivated enough to organize and direct themselves, little may be
accomplished. The effort in setting up the group may be wasted for
some organizations. Students will inevitably leave, and new
students may have other interests than the focus of the human rights
organization. Even with a group of students that remain interested
in the focus of the human rights organization over multiple years, a
single human rights organization may not be able to come up with
projects on a schedule that matches the annual rhythm of a law
student's interest and time.
Ideally, human rights organizations and law schools could have
enough overlapping relationships that a friendly competition could
arise. Some schools, formal clinics or virtual clinics (perhaps in the
form of student clubs8 4) could win the reputation of being able to
direct themselves on worthwhile projects for human rights groups.
Human rights groups, in turn, could strive to earn the reputation of
supplying interesting, rewarding projects.
This kind of competition could arise without any center, or it
could arise through a centralized coordinating organization that
centralized proposals, or through several centers. This kind of
competition will only arise, however, once the model for the virtual
human rights clinic becomes more widespread.
Human rights are inherently a good topic for the virtual
approach. While all subjects, including human rights, are enriched
by context and personal interaction, human rights as a concept is
based upon the idea of universality and the enlightenment. While
efforts to protect human rights may have a dark side,85 most
practitioners reasonably believe that there is far more to gain from
the defense of human rights than is lost. The vehicles for human
rights protection, unlike, say tenant defense or local labor law
violations are often broad in scope. Thus, there exists the Inter-
84. At most law schools, student clubs or organizations are easy to form and
qualify for low-level institutional financial support through student government or
other means.
85. See generally DAvID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM (2004).
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American system, the European system, the African system, and UN
systems, among others.
Of course, more abstract bonds of interaction can have
problems with trust, miscommunication, and manipulation. To take
an obvious example, in Haiti, where claims of human rights
violations can be politically motivated, one can imagine anti-Lavalas
and pro-Lavalas groups using willing students to line up on either
side of a particular dispute. In such circumstances, there is the
possibility that such efforts on behalf of human rights will be seen as
manipulative or disingenuous, either not living up to the universal
ideals held by the supporter of human rights effort, or showing how
problematic those universal ideals can be in practice. There is no
neat solution for this problem, but I believe that the more attention
by people of good will that is brought to complex claims of
antagonistic victimhood, the greater the likelihood of peaceful
dispute resolution.
For those who are specifically focused on Haiti or on detainee
rights, the Decision and the virtual human rights clinic model have a
particular importance. U.S.-based, Haitian-focused organizations
are already accustomed to managing communication across the
great divides of wealth and culture between the (geographically
proximate) United States and Haiti. Efforts such as the American
Civil Liberties Union's National Prison Project are already working
with partners across the country and overcoming institutional
barriers to communication. Both types of organizations, those
focused on Haiti and those focused on detainee rights, are well
suited to exploit the virtual human rights clinic model and harvest
the energy and intelligence of law students without physical, face-
to-face communication. Both types of organization can cite the
Decision in their work. Both types of organization can follow the
specific tactic of filing a petition before the commission, using the
Petition used in this case as a model if appropriate.
It is also important to note the follow-up work that human
rights groups have already pursued on this specific case. Following
the leadership of IJDH and the BAI to ensure compliance with the
decision, organizations such as the National Lawyers Guild, the
American Association of Jurists, the International Association of
Democratic Lawyers, the New England Human Rights
Organization, and others have reached out directly to the Haitian
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government as well as to foreign governments and regional groups
such as the Caribbean Community.86 These efforts are vital if the
opportunity provided by the decision is to be realized.
XI. The Significance for Foreign Governments and
International Development Agencies
For foreign governments and international development
agencies ("Foreign Governments and Agencies"), simply identifying
concrete problems to address can be a challenge. The Decision
neatly describes and demonstrates one problem: the calamitous state
of the Haitian criminal justice system, particularly its prison system
and lack of judicial review of detention. Fixing this problem is
central not only to good governance, but to addressing other
important problems of disease and poverty. Prisons are centers for
disease, and they usually thrust the families of prisoners even
further into destitution. Fixing prison conditions are a distinct,
achievable goal for Foreign Governments and Agencies. The
Decision should focus their attention on this neglected problem.
Particular attention should be paid to the notorious Penitencier
National.
The failings of the criminal justice system may seem like a
purely domestic problem, but in fact is closely tied to many
international objectives of Foreign Governments and Agencies. For
example, organizations wish to work with a stable Haitian
government, ruled by law, transparent and reliable in its
procedures. Such a government is not only more likely to
economically develop, but is also more likely to manage other
problems of concern to Foreign Governments and Agencies
including reducing international drug smuggling and large
numbers of asylum-seekers and economic migrants. With the
problem of a failed criminal justice system identified as an
undeniable a legal fact, Foreign Governments and Agencies can be
part of the solution, if they wish to be.
To start, Foreign Governments and Agencies can provide direct
financial and technical assistance to the Haitian criminal justice
system. It is important to note that "economic conditionality"
should not be required for such aid, that is, there is no need to
condition loans or grants in order to restrict other government
86. Correspondence on file with the author.
20091
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
expenditures to match the economic and financial policies of the
foreign government or international development agency. Financial
and technical assistance should not be seen as impinging on the
economic sovereignty of Haiti by demanding a change in social
services, welfare, or trade policy, as is often the case with
economically conditioned aid. Instead, the agency or government
can simply fund the construction of new detention facilities and
courtrooms, provide technical training, and respond to the demand
from local communities. This aid should, if possible, be in addition
to aid already given to Haiti.
In addition, foreign governments and agencies can directly, or
through funding other groups indirectly, monitor prison conditions,
report on the state of the judiciary, and identify possible instances of
political prosecution and imprisonment. This may be a continuation
of an established practice, as in the case of U.S. State Department
reports, or it may be an entirely new effort. Regardless, if a better
functioning Haitian criminal justice system is important to the
realization of the goals of foreign governments or agencies, they
should be prepared to sustain such monitoring.
Whatever foreign governments and agencies attempt to heal
what they identify as a sickened Haitian criminal justice system,
they should keep in mind the maxim "first, do no harm." Haitians
have welcomed [medical and other] assistance from other countries
such as Venezuela and Cuba. But many are also understandably
wary of interference with domestic issues after a history of
enslavement, colonialism, exploitation, occupation, support of
authoritarian regimes, and isolation of elected governments.
Foreign governments and agencies should expect skepticism, and
may have to earn good will over a period of decades if they wish to
partner meaningfully with Haitians.
XII. The Significance for the
Inter-American Human Rights System
Neither the Commission nor the Court has an enforcement
mechanism in the sense of a police force or military. The only real
enforcement mechanism is the Haitian government itself, which is
bound by law to respect the decision, including monitor and report
the situation. By requiring the Haitian government to report back,
the Court constructively works with the Haitian government and
encourages the Haitian government to work with detainees and
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their advocates.
It is in the interest of the Commission and the Court to have the
decisions of the Court (such as Yvon Neptune v. Haiti) respected.
One asset available to these institutions is permanency. Indeed,
compared to the lifespan of a typical Haitian government, these
institutions appear venerable and durable. This is only really an
asset if decisions are allowed to build upon each other, creating a
sense of time and history, sending the message that "naming and
shaming" will continue for as long as it needs to, and that ongoing
systematic human rights abuses will not be forgotten or ignored.
Accordingly, the Commission and the Court should be open to
further petitions or referrals of this nature, either regarding Haiti or
regarding the human rights violations found in Yvon Neptune v.
Haiti in other countries. The Commission and Court should also be
willing to reference the case as precedent, and underline its
importance. Finally, the Commission and Court should also be
willing to issue new decisions if Haiti does not comply with the
Decision if prompted by further petition or on its own action, as
such noncompliance represents an ongoing violation of the
American Convention.87
XIII. The Road Ahead
In many ways, the very fact that the Decision exists is
representative of Haiti's fragile but real democratic transition. Prior
to the establishment of democracy in 1990 and the acceptance of the
Court's jurisdiction in 1998, the question of protecting human rights
in Haiti through domestic and international legal processes would
not have seriously arisen. After all, the Court cannot act without
jurisdiction, and the domestic judiciary was largely powerless
against dictatorship. If Neptune had died in detention, it's unlikely
the process would have culminated in the Decision. Neptune
survived in part due to international attention focused on his case.
Under a dictatorship, he probably would not have survived. The
87. Paragraph 191 of the Decision states as follows:
In keeping with its consistent practice, the Court reserves the
authority, inherent in its attributes and derived also from Article 65 of
the American Convention, to monitor the execution of all aspects of
this judgment. The case will be closed when the State as complied fully
with all aspects of the judgment. Within one year from notification of
this judgment, Haiti must provide the Court with a report on the
measures adopted to comply with it.
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Decision also required activists and attorneys in Haiti and the
United States communicating with each other and publicly
demanding justice. These efforts are always hard, but easier now
than they would have been under a dictatorship. On the other
hand, the Decision also demonstrates the current deficits in Haitian
democracy, the uncertainty of civil rights and political processes,
and the abhorrent conditions that undermine the foundation of
Haiti's future. The Decision represents a partial victory, a battered
but surviving promise of justice.
History, says the aphorism, is written by the victors. Of course,
good history is more complicated than that. Sometimes the partial
victors, exhausted from their struggles, are too busy afterwards to
write it down. Advocates with limited resources do not always
prioritize making their limited victories as widely celebrated as they
might be. Despite illustrating a number of perspectives, the
underlying perspective of this Article is inevitably in part a
perspective of a victor, as I participated in the advocacy on behalf of
the Inter-American Human Rights System and was pleased by the
Decision. Too often such victories are essentially forgotten by the
next generation of interested participants, particularly if barriers of
language, geography, and culture stand between the story of the
victory and the potential audience for the story. Too often those
with an interest in building systems that protect human rights only
focus on problems, and neglect victories, however problematic those
victories may be. This Commentary attempts to present a story with
an underlying perspective that celebrates victory and looks to
further victory while acknowledging the limits and challenges of the
situation.
Some readers may feel that the Commentary does not treat a
particular perspective with as much depth as might be desired.
Others may feel that some perspectives were neglected, such as the
perspective of economic, social, or cultural human rights,8 8 the
perspective of crime survivors, the perspective of private
international investors, or others. There is doubtless some truth in
any such criticism, which can only serve as an invitation for further
88. One example of an effort which integrates economic, social and cultural
human rights with civil and political rights is the Health and Human Rights Prison
Project, a joint effort of IJDH, BAI, Partners in Health and Zanmi Lasante. A
complete description of the project is available at http://ijdh.org/pdf/HHRPP.pdf
(last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
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work, additional perspectives, and deeper analysis.
I hope that this Commentary provides an example, however
limited or cursory, of approaching the same topic from a variety of
perspectives. Perhaps this will assist those who are involved, or
would like to be involved, in the effort of protecting the human
rights of detainees to act together in a greater spirit of solidarity and
mutual understanding.
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